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THE POND SEPARATES CULTURES BUT NOT VALUES: A
COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE FRENCH CODIFICATION OF
RIGHT TO WITHDRAWAL OF LABOR AND THE AMERICAN
CONCEPT OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
*

Thomas D. Aaron Wazlavek. Esq.
Abstract

The differences and similarities between the United States common
law concept of "right to work" and the modern development in France of
the right to withdraw labor following the "Yellow Vest" movement in
2018 demonstrate a parallel diminution of workers' rights. These changes
are motivated by the same values inherent within capitalism that are
superimposed through the law. This Article analyzes the social and legal
contexts in both countries which demonstrate that the superimposition of
these values through law is a continuing modern western trend. The key
difference is that while the French model is designed to decrease the
pressure for strike actions by workers, it also serves as a protection to
workers as compared with the American model which exists as a tool to
remove workplace protections by substantially altering the terms and
conditions of employment. Further, this Article demonstrates that these
concepts are both divergent and convergent in terms of core shared values
and the peripheral aspect of laws setting cultural norms. This Article then
concludes through comparative analysis that while the French right to
withdraw labor is a product of legislative supremacy, and the American
view within the common law is that at-will employment is the standard,
the French model is a product of generations of social negotiations. The
American model is a product of the easily swayed influences within the
common law that allow a new legal theory with little to no precedential
value at the time of its proposal to be adopted in sweeping fashion with
very little civil discourse.
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INTRODUCTION

On the heels of nationwide strike actions, protests, and immense
pressure from the business sector, the French General Assembly codified
the right to withdrawal of labor for unsafe work conditions. The deep
cultural value and regard within France for strike actions harkens back to
the working-class values that developed within the French Revolution.'
That value and regard was similarly seen with ongoing labor unrest
surrounding the codification in 2008 and which continued through the
Yellow Vest Movement more than a decade later. The codification of
these values within the French Labor Code for the right to withdraw labor2
represents significant social negotiations over the course of generations.
In stark contrast, the American common law tradition of right to work is
generally regarded as developing from the seemingly overnight sweeping
adoption of the concept of at-will employment in the late nineteenth
century. 3 In both situations, these efforts represent convergent parallel
diminutions of workers' rights motivated by the same values inherent
within capitalism that are superimposed through the law.
Colin Randall, The French Cling Fiercely to Their Strike Culture, NAT'L NEWS (Apr.
7, 2018), https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/commentthe-french-cling-fiercely-to-theirstrike-culture-1.719507 [https://perma.cc/8GB6-8Q4C].
2. Melissa De Witte, France'sYellow Vest Movement Has MorphedFarBeyond a Carbon
Tax Protest, Stanford Economist Says, STAN. NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/

1.

2019/01/23/know-frances-yellow-vest-movement/ [https://perma.cc/6T2E-LR4D].
3. Compare HORACE

G.

WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

(Albany, John D. Parsons, Jr. Ist ed. 1877) (the first published treatise on at-will employment
within American common law), with Michael J. Philips, Toward a Middle Way in the Polarized

Debate over Employment at Will, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 444-45 (1992) (discussing the
development of the at-will rule in the late nineteenth century).
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I. OVERVIEW

This Article explores in Section II the apropos modern historical
developments of both the codification of the right to withdrawal of labor
in France as a civil code jurisdiction and the evolution of at-will
employment in the American common law tradition. Relying on primary
and secondary sources for both systems, historical materialism
demonstrates a clear superimposition of capitalist values through law as
a continuing modern trend. While the French model is designed to
decrease the pressure for strike actions by workers, it also serves as a
protection for workers as compared to the American model, which exists
merely as a tool to remove workplace protections by substantially altering
the terms and conditions of employment.
Next, this Article analyzes in Section III the comparative difference
and similarities in both jurisdictions. Both the right to withdrawal of labor
and the evolution of at-will employment are simultaneously divergent
and convergent in terms of core shared values and the peripheral aspect
of laws setting norms. The hyper oscillation of these values becomes
evident through the differences in both countries by the treatment of
personal jurisdiction and contractual violations, as discussed in Section
III.A. Additionally, both jurisdictions have converging legal processes
reflected by European Council Regulations and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as analyzed in Section III.A. However, there is a stark
divergence in applying these processes, evident through compensation
for injuries on the job, unification and stratification of the administrative
state, minimum wage laws, and maximum hours. This Article concludes
by asserting that repeatedly within this analysis the values superimposed
by law in both jurisdictions represent a divergence in the application of
the law between the two countries and a convergence in the applied value
of the economics of a cryptotype supporting capitalism.

II.

MODERN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Centering historical materialism provides the deepest understanding
of the social contexts surrounding the codification and implementation of
the French right to withdrawal of labor and the American concept of atwill employment evolving. into the right to work. Historical materialism
searches for how societies engage in decision making based off their
material, economic, and social needs. In Section II.A below, the
codification in France is discussed in detail. While Section II.B further
explores the American evolution of at-will employment and the common
modern conflation with the right to work. Historical materialism
demonstrates a clear superimposition of capitalistic values through law

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

[Vol. 33

FJLORIDA JOURNAL OF INThRNATIONAL LAW

78

4
of
as a growing western trend, raising the comparative presumption
5 Within France, the general social distrust of judges 6 leads to
similarity.
7
hierarchical judicial subordination, as reflected in the model of
legislative supremacy; comparatively, in the American tradition, the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter in interpreting the law-despite the
8
common law ideal of coordinated judicial authority.

A. French Yellow Vest Movement and the Codification of the Right to
Withdrawal ofLabor
Like most powerful populist social protest movements, what began
with a spark quickly ignited into a raging fire of social discontent during
the Yellow Vest Movement. Since 2008, French motor vehicle drivers
have been required to keep a high-visibility yellow vest, or gilete juane,
in their vehicles for safety related matters in case of breakdown on the
roadside or similar situations where a motorist might need to be visible
to others. 9 In 2018, the vest itself became a symbol of protest and social
redress of working-class issues related to business interests within French
culture.
As President Macron and the French General Assembly sought to
impose carbon taxes that would increase fuel prices in November of 2018,
the French public took to the streets to protest. "We are in a state of
insurrection, I've never seen anything like it," said Jeanne d'Hauteserre,
the Mayor of Paris's 8th District." The protests, similar to the Occupy
Movement in America, rapidly became a clearinghouse of social unrest
for a variety of issues. In response to the nationwide unrest, President
Macron conceded by not implementing the fuel tax for consumers, raising
the minimum wage, and even lowering other taxes.]
These concessions however were representative of over a decade's
worth of labor unrest and social negotiations within France regarding
OF
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
(2010).
33-34
ASIA
EAST
AND
AMERICA,
LATIN
EUROPE,
IN
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
5. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 39 (Tony
4.

Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
6. At the threshold it should be noted that even within prized French fictional literature
in the
such as the 1833 famed account of Notre-Dame de Paris, or the Hunchback of Notre Dame

English version, the antagonist Claude Frollo was a judge and archdeacon of Notre Dame.

of
7. Inga Markovits, Playing the Opposites Game: On Mirjan Damaska's The Faces
(1989).
Justice and State Authority, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1313, 1316
8.

Id.;

cf MIRIAN R. DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 50 (1986).

9. Vanessa Friedman, The Power of the Yellow Vest, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018),
[https://
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/fashion/yellow-vests-france-protest-fashion.html

perma.cc/8BNG-94DV].
10. The 'Yellow

Vest'

Movement

Explained,

AL

JAZEERA

(Dec.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/4/the-yellow-vest-movement-explained

4, 2018),
[https://perma

.cc/H7G7-8LD6].
11. De Witte, supra note 2.
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modern labor policy reforms and generations worth of working-class
struggles. In 2007, the General Assembly promulgated Article L4131-1
of the French Labor Code which states that "[t]he worker shall
immediately alert the employer to any work situation that he has
reasonable grounds to believe presents a serious and imminent danger to
his life or health and to any defect he finds in the protection systems."12
Enactment of the article in 2007 followed on the heels of strike actions
across France similar to the Yellow Vest Movement. In the lead up to the
adoption and codification of the right to withdrawal of labor, French
workers took to the streets to protest the restrictions within previous
proposals.1 3 In 2008, the current law went into force through the
legislative codification of Order 2007-329 in the Official Journal of the
French Republic.1 4 The law aimed to decrease the pressure on employers
from strike actions by allowing workers the opportunity to withdraw from
unsafe working conditions. The public law was negotiated in the public
forum and achieved balance between the interests of employers and
French organized labor. In Section III, this tension between business
interests and workers will be further analyzed regarding differences in
each system for contractual violations, as well as discussing divergences
in application in each system.
Labor unrest came to the forefront again a decade later in these social
negotiations when tragedy struck the French rail system and the right to
withdrawal of labor within France came to the forefront of social
negotiations during the Yellow Vest Movement.' 5 As an important aside,
French legal culture itself went through an entire codification movement
in the nineteenth century while the common law is regarded in many
respects as having codiphobia.1 6 Similarly, the Confederation Ginerale
du Travail (CGT), or the labor organization representing train operators

12. CODE DU TRAVAIL [LABOR CODE] art. L4131-1 (Fr.).
13. Elaine Sciolino, FranceDrops Labor Law That Led to Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/france-drops-labor-law-that-led-to-protests.
html [https://perma.cc/3MZN-K82Y].

14. Ordinance to Labor Code, Ordonnance No. 2007-329 (2007) (Fr.).
15. CompareJake Cigainero, Who Are France'sYellow Vest Protestors, and What Do They
Want?, NPR (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672862353/who-are-francesyellow-vest-protesters-and-what-do-they-want [https://perma.cc/HR4C-2FU2], and Alissa J.
Rubin, Hundreds of Thousands in France Protest Taxes by Blocking Roads, N.Y. Times (Nov.
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/world/europe/french-drivers-protest-fuel-taxes

.html [https://perma.cc/86GM-NLYL], with QUENTIN RAVELLI, FUEL FEUD. THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE YELLOW VEST 13 (The Political Economy of Social Movements Working Paper,
In press. 2021), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03101145/document [https://perma cc/P2XXLFJG] (demonstrating the buildup of labor unrest within the Yellow Vest Movement from 2018
through the invocation of the right to withdraw labor in 2019).

16. Aniceto Masferrer, French Codification and "Codiphobia" in Common Law
Traditions, 34 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1, 8 (2019).
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within France, itself has a storied background within the French socialist
17
movement at the turn of the twentieth century.
Here, these two culturally significant aspects of French culture were
on a collision course. Author Anne-Laure Peries summarized:
Between the 18th and the 21st of October 2019, following
an accident between a regional train and a truck at a level
crossing in the North of France, French train drivers
(between 700 drivers, according to the SNCF management,
and 17,000 drivers, according to the CGT union) refused to
8
keep working since they considered themselves in danger.'
This accident brought Article L 4131-1, or the right to withdrawal of
labor, into the scope of the Yellow Vest Movement because of the
continuing labor unrest with regard to law's favoring the economic
interests inherent within capitalism.1 9 Peries continued:
The collision on October 16, 2019, had cut all the alerting
equipment, forcing the slightly injured driver, to walk
around one kilometer along the railway line, in order to raise
the alarm, leaving behind seventy passengers alone in the
train. The drivers and later the CGT union representatives
complained that, unlike in earlier times, the regional train did
not have a ticket inspector on board. They argued therefore
that train drivers were in danger and the drivers interrupted
their work, even in trains which did have a ticket inspector
on board (such as high-speed trains). 20
The train collision led to three labor unions, including the CGT, for
the French National Railway Company or the Sociite nationale des
chemins deferfrangais(SNCF), to declare a strike in December 2019.21
The significance of the ticket inspectors became a major flashpoint
between organized labor and the French government because of the duty
of each worker to alert the employer to the withdrawal of labor prior to
17. See JOINT LEGIS. COMM. INVESTIGATING SEDITIOUS ACTIVITIES, N.Y. STATE SENATE,
REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM: ITS HISTORY, PURPOSE AND TACTICS 99-106 (1920) [hereinafter
REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM] (discussing the expansive history between the socialist movement
and CGT in France).
18. Anne-Laure Peries, France - Withdrawalfrom a Work Situation Versus the Right to
68

Strike, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d 15eab9211-46f5-8610-96d6948f025a [https://perma.cc/Q9SJ-MPLT].
19. Caroline Haskins, The Paris 'Yellow Vest' ProtestShows the Flaws.of Capitalism, VICE
(Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/nepkpw/the-pars-yellow-vest-protests-show-

the-flaws-of-capitalism [https://perma.cc/DA45-X5G3].
20. Id.
21. Angelique Chrisafis, France Grinds to Halt in the Biggest Strikes of Macron's
Presidency, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/05/francebraces-for-biggest-strike-of-emmanuel-macron-presidency [https://perma.cc/L97T-B4QF].
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entering unsafe working conditions. The duty to alert the employer to
unsafe conditions will be further discussed in Section III discussing
convergences in legal processes.
French labor organizations quickly mobilized to protest further social
reforms proposed by President Macron during the Yellow Vest
Movement. Citing issues with pension reforms:
French rail workers, air-traffic controllers, teachers, and
public sector staff staged walkouts and took to the streets
against proposed changes to the pension system. Rail
services almost ground to a halt, with eighty-two percent of
drivers on strike and at least ninety percent of regional trains
cancelled, amid fears that the open-ended transport
disruption could continue for days. In Paris, eleven out of the
sixteen metro lines were shut, forcing commuters to
scramble to hire bikes and scooters. 2 2
The French government critiqued the strike actions as "wild strikes," 2 3
similar to the American characterization of unmeritorious strikes under
the National Labor Relations Act as wild cat strikes. 24 Historically, the
socialist aims of CGT have not been to overthrow government but to
make it "evolve towards that time when it will meet the requirements of
industrial democracy." 25 Modernly, these pressure tactics on employers
and government in France have been met with increased concerns over
the impact on business interests. Peries' analysis concluded:
[T]his type of accident cannot justify a right of
withdrawal for all the other drivers who operate a train
without a ticket inspector. The absence of an inspector
cannot be considered as a serious and imminent danger. The
exercising of a right of withdrawal is even more debatable
for those drivers who operate a train with a ticket inspector.
The analysis could have been different if a fault in the
security systems had been identified for each driver who
stopped working. 2 6

22. Id.
23. Peries, supranote 18 (referring to the characterization of wildcat strikes or unauthorized
withdrawals of labor, similar to NLRA, § 7, as unmeritorious and unlawful strike actions).
24. Morrison Handsaker & Marjorie L. Handsaker, Remedies and Penaltiesfor Wildcat
Strikes: How Arbitratorsand Federal Courts Have Ruled, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 279, 279 (1973).
25. REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM, supra note 17, at 106.
26. Peries, supra note 18.
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Peries' view is indicative of that across the business sector, in parts of
government, in mainstream journalism, and even within a large part of
French culture at the time. 2 7
Peries' view represents an overarching value inherent in capitalism
that places restrictions on workers' ability to implement pressure tactics
on employers through strike actions in favor of business interests. Despite
this, the basic concept of an employee or subordinate is vastly different
in France as compared to America, which will be discussed in turn in the
next Section elaborating on the evolution of at-will employment within
America toward the modern judicially imposed national fiat of "right to
work." 2 8 Repeatedly one sees that in both jurisdictions business interests
have a dominant presence.
B. American Evolution of At-Will Employment
The at-will employment rule has been rooted firmly in American
common law since its widespread adoption at the end of the nineteenth
century. 2 9 Some scholars suggest its almost overnight adoption was
30
rooted in the advancement of capitalism. Others disagree with that
dialectal analysis and have tactfully delineated its operation during
colonial times, while still agreeing that its more widespread adoption by
the judiciary was because of the economic conditions of post-colonial
America. 3 1 Despite those nuances between law and economics, legal
academia has come to the consensus that Horace Wood's 1878 treatise
delineating the rule of at-will employment greatly influenced the concept
of an employee in America, towards its brief constitutional canonization
2
during the Lochner era.3
New Deal legislation, such as the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), attempted to level the playing field between workers and
employers by making terms and conditions of employment collectively
27. French Railway Strikes Cause Misery for Passengers, NAT'L NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/europe/french-railway-strikes-cause-misery-for-pass

engers-1.718472 [https://perma.cc/35ZN-RQCD].
28. Thomas D. Aaron Wazlavek, Defending Exclusive Representation: Tyranny of the
Minority in the Workplace for EducatorsPoses Special Risks to CharterSchool Teachers, SSRN
(July 24, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3786361 [https://perma.cc/ZVN5-P7KL] (discussing
the nationally imposed judicial fiat of right to work in America post Janus v. American Federation

of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)).
29. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 134, 272.
30. Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 127 (1976) (portion discussing the development of the rule as favoring middle-level
managers in the late nineteenth century, motivated by the developing capitalist economy).
31. Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule Revisited: A
Challenge to its Origins as Based in the Development ofAdvanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB.

& EMP. L.J. 75, 105 (1995).
32. Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical andEconomic Reassessment of the

Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 688 (1994).
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negotiable for organized groups, including causes for termination, on one
hand. 33 On the other hand, the French Labor Code, which resumes all
forms of employment to be based on a binding contract, 4 creates an
obligation by the employer to inform workers of the conditions applicable
to the .contract or employment relationship, 3 5 and further requires the
employer to provide a written statement containing all specified terms
and conditions. 36
As segregation came into the forefront of the American psyche, so too
did the superimposition of the concept of right to work. 37 With at-will
employment already firmly cemented by the judiciary, the next push was
for the removal of the protections of the NLRA vis-a-vis legislation and
advocacy designed to pit members of the working class against each other
based on their race. 38 The repeated attempts to nationalize right to work
through legislation over decades have consistently failed, but the end goal
of the concept was imposed by judicial fiat in Janus by attacking the
entities formed by workers.
These entities formed by workers in America are the only effective
concertedly pooled resource that consistently challenge discrimination in
the workplace under subsequent legislation, such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. A point of divergence exists within the core of shared
values in both jurisdictions disfavoring discrimination, as reflected by the
gravity of the nature of the offense within the law. In France,
discrimination is strictly barred within the Labor Code for employment
contexts, 39 and separately is a much broader misdemeanor within the

33. Richard F. Watt, The New Deal Court, Organized Labor, and the Taft-Hartley Act,
7 LAW. GUILD REV. 193, 204 (1947).
34.

1 BERND WAAS & Guus HEEMA VAN Voss, RESTATEMENT OF LABOUR LAW

IN EUROPE:

THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYEE 200 (2017) (discussing employment relationships).
35. Id. at 525-26 (discussing employer notification obligations through Council Directive
91/533/EEC, art. 2, 1991 O.J. (L 288) 32 (EC)).
36.

CODE DU TRAVAIL [LABOR CODE] art. L1221-3 (Fr.).

37. Compare Berry Craig, Right to Work Founder Was a Klan Fan, AFL-CIO (Aug.
22,
2017), https://aflcio.org/2017/8/22/right-work-founder-was-klan-fan [https://perma.cc/DD8AQ36D] (discussing the origins of right-to-work under Jim Crow laws), with Olivia Paschal, The

PRO Act Would Undo Decades of Southern Anti-Union Laws Rooted in Racism, FACING SOUTH
(Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.facingsouth.org/2021/03/pro-act-would-undo-decades-southernanti-union-laws-rooted-racism [https://perma.cc/6PX9-LE4N] (detailing the background of right
to work legislation and its codification within states as a product of racial discrimination stemming
largely not from business interests but anti-segregation, and how the current PRO Act would
address this systemic failure).
38. See generally International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (@IATSE),
TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2021, 8:27 PM), https://twitter.com/iatse/status/1352427628515516416?s=21
[https://perma.cc/7MXK-JW46] (quoting Vance Muse).
39. CODE DU TRAVAIL [LABOR CODE] art. LI 132-1 (Fr.).
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Penal Code punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment and
up to £45,000.40
Both jurisdictions represent the superimposition of the values inherent
in capitalism through law as a continuing modern western trend. In
France, the right to withdrawal of labor simultaneously decreases the
pressure on business interests from strike tactics, while serving as a
socially negotiated protection for workers on the job. In America, the
evolution of at-will employment towards right to work imposition by
judicial fiat in Janus has functioned as a tool to remove workplace
protections. These similarities in strongly favoring business interests
illustrate this modem western trend favoring capitalism.
What started in America as an attempt to modernize the concept of the
employment relationship by the rapid widespread implementation of the
at-will employment rule transformed into twenty-first century ongoing
trench warfare over racism. Legislation criminalizing discrimination in
its many forms still has yet to take hold in many American jurisdictions,
leaving communities in peril and their workers subject to the predatory
tendencies of capitalism to encourage a race to the bottom. While France
and America both diverge and converge in core shared values and the
peripheral aspect of laws setting norms, despite France's abundance of
safeguards for workers, its policymakers are similarly too easily
influenced by economic interests that converge with core shared values
favoring capitalism.

III.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

The right to withdraw labor in France and the evolution of at-will
employment into the modern nationwide judicial imposition of right to
work in America simultaneously diverge and converge in core shared
values and the peripheral aspect of laws setting norms. These divergences
and convergences become clearer through the differences in both
jurisdictions by treatment of personal jurisdiction and contractual
violations. Further, both the French Civil Code and the American
common law have convergent legal processes but diverge in legal
applications. Damaska cautioned comparativists not to fall for superficial
similarities. 4 1 Sacco encouraged scholars to find formants, such as those
and
contained in declamatory statements within constitutions and codes,
42
The
conclusions.
legal
reach
to
give
for the reasons learned individuals
treatment of issues between the civil code and common law reveals a
strong cryptotype favoring business interests in both countries.

40. CODE PENAL [PENAL CODE] art. 225-2 (Fr.).

41.

DAMAKA,

supra note 8, at 1.

42. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to ComparativeLaw, 39 AM. J.

COMPAR. L. 1, 31-34 (1991).
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A.. Differences in Legal Systems
The American common law concept of personal jurisdiction struggles
with where a cause of action should lie based on delineated constitutional
principles of minimum contacts and reasonable notions of fair play and
substantial justice. However, the French Civil Code makes personal
jurisdiction much less complicated for French nationals but remarkably
leaves millions of foreign workers with a higher barrier for access to
justice as plaintiffs.
1. Personal Jurisdiction and Nationality-Based Jurisdiction
Consent generally within both countries is a core shared value but is
treated much differently when it comes to personal jurisdiction. Physical
presence of the defendant is a peripheral shared value derivatively
demonstrating consent to the jurisdiction, and it too is treated differently
in each system.
Article 14 of the French Civil Code enables a French plaintiff to bring
an action against anyone in French courts based on the plaintiff's French
nationality, without regard to whether the defendants or the dispute has
any connection to France. 4 3 The Brussels Convention established wide
enforcement of multinational judgments," which continues to this day. 5
This simplicity in commencing an action for French plaintiffs,
especially French citizens, represents a divergence of core shared values
with the American common law by establishing personal jurisdiction
through consent. It further represents a divergence at the periphery of the
actual physical presence of the defendant in the forum state. These stark
differences significantly impact the resolution of disputes in each system,
rendering recovery simpler for French plaintiffs.
In a rather complicated fashion, the American common law system
struggles with balancing reasonableness factors, 46 contact with the forum
state and establishing presence within the jurisdiction, 47 notions of fair

43. Henry P. deVries & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions-A

Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IOwA L. REv. 306, 317 (1959).
44. See Consolidated Version of the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters arts. 25-49, 55, Sept. 27, 1968, 1998
O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; see also Brussels Convention, supra, art. 3.

45. Council Regulation 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU).
46. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980) (citing
reasonableness factors relevant to personal jurisdiction and resolving the question of transient
jurisdiction within forum states); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14

(1987) (upholding the World-Wide reasonableness factors).
47. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (intentionality of publisher's acts into forum
state satisfied minimum contacts); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474

(1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (reiterating that the
"constitutional touchstone" comports with purposeful availment).
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play, 4 8 and substantial justice. 4 9 By applying those rules to foreign
defendants and foreign law, the mechanical unwieldiness within decision
50
making becomes even clearer.
These significant differences present challenges to plaintiffs in the
treatment of American common law claims that French plaintiffs do not
endure. The dispositive nature of personal jurisdiction for foreign
defendants in America indeed leaves many plaintiffs in a procedural
abyss, having to appeal interpretative issues before the highest court to
see resolution of basic matters such as service of process before a suit can
fully commence. 5 1 In France, service of process for example is simply
reviewed by the court at the threshold of filing as part of the initial
proceedings.5 2
In the French Code, a change for this simple concept would require
social negotiation and codification. The key difference here is that, while
in both jurisdictions service of process is essential, this basic threshold
for commencing suit often requires frequent reinterpretation within the
common law which enables the gatekeeping function of decision making
by the courts.5 3 This gatekeeping function by the Supreme Court does not
encourage equal justice under law but is instead a systemic restriction for
access to justice because it grants a defacto advantage to repeat players
over lay litigants. Further, it encourages a clogged docket due to the
4
reliance on reinterpretation and delays the administration ofjustice.5 The
only real social advantage here becomes one to the legal profession
itself-demand for repeat players through a monopsony. Perhaps, as
some have suggested, changes in the common law's discourse serves only
55
to increase the power of courts themselves.
48. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 736-37 (1877) (rejecting notorious publication due to

lack of personal service in former test for minimum contacts with forum jurisdiction out of

concerns for fair play).
49. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (clarifying the notions of fair play and substantial
justice).

50. See G & G Prods. L.L.C. v. Rusic, 902 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2018).
51. Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010).
52. Anke Sprengel, France: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Comparative Guide,
MONDAQ (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/france/litigation-mediation-arbitration/
855058/enforcement-of-foreign-judgments-comparative-guide [https://perma.cc/G993-HZKH].
53. Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No Exit,

47 AKRON L. REV. 617, 639 (2014) (discussing the gate keeping role of the Court through
personal jurisdiction).
54. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure In Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 985-91 (1987) (discussing gate
keeping and justiciability barriers, natural advantages of repeat players in dispute resolution, and
the resulting delayed administration of justice from an overreliance on judicial interpretation).
55. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent

37-44 (U. Chi. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 363, 2008) https://ssrn.com/abstract-1019074
[https://perma.cc/Z6ZU-5GYP].
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Restricted access to justice and barriers to dispute resolution over
matters such as personal jurisdiction in the American common law
tradition represent a gatekeeping function for the law by the Supreme
Court, not an effective resolution of claims. It follows then that in the
French civil system where workers can hale into court any potential
defendant for compensation, there would be a balancing of business
interests and equity for workers such as within the codification of the
right to withdrawal of labor.
IV. JURISDICTION FOR CONTRACTUAL VIOLATIONS

The codification of the right to withdraw labor sought to decrease the
pressure of strike actions as a form of a public law negotiated in the public
forum between the interests of employers and French organized labor.
This concept of social negotiation towards codification accords with
classical French philosophers, such as Rousseau, who advocated for the
social contract theory. 56 Comparatively, in America, our concept of social
negotiations necessarily depends on the gatekeeping functions of
representatives within a republic-the very concept of indirect
democracy that Rousseau despised almost as much as aristrocrats and
monarchs.57
The republican form of government addicted to judicial intervention
in America even rears its unwieldy nature in jurisdiction for contractual
violations. 58 Surprisingly though, there is also a conscription of the wider
latitude supranationally under the Brussels Convention Article 5(1), as
amended by Article 4 of the 1989 Accession Convention. This Article
sets out the supranational jurisdiction over member states that have optedin, and enables parties to sue and be sued in a similarly convergent
fashion with the concept of minimum contacts:
[I]n matters relating to individual contracts of
employment, this place is that where the employee
habitually carries out his work, or if the employee does not
habitually carry out his work in any one country, the
employer may also be sued in the courts for the place where
the business which engaged the employee was or is now
situated. 59
56. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968); see
generally Brian Duignan, Jean-Jacques Rosseau, BRITANNICA (June 28, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Jacques-Rousseau [https://perma.cc/Q7C7-MRTW].
57. Id. at chs. 3-7 (describing views towards hierarchical systems of government and
presenting tension inherent within democracy and self-governance).
58. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985); Travelers Health Assn. v.

Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950); see also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23
(1957).
59. Brussels Convention, supra note 44, art. 5.1.
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Unsurprisingly though, French law does not yield here for
60
employment contract violations under nationality-based jurisdiction.
Instead, it retains the characteristics of "exorbitant jurisdiction" that
scholars within the American common law tradition thought should be
restrained. 6 1 In turn, French nationals have choice of forum through the
early holding by the Cour de Cassation that actor sequiturforum rei was
62
legislatively intended to be undercut in favor of French citizenship.
Employment contract disputes then are treated as either falling under
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention for non-citizens and citizens, or
under Article 14 for citizens who wish to invoke nationality-based
jurisdiction, with even the highest court hesitant to disturb exorbitant
63
jurisdiction due to legislative supremacy.
In contrast with the uniform treatment within the American common
law, French workers who lack citizenship-such as migrants and
international workers-fall outside the far reach of Article 14.
Observably, these neoliberal capitalist notions that understate and placate
the struggle for a basic class identity certainly are not the "apotheosis of
rights"6M but are superimposed by law. This is simultaneously a
convergence with common law values of contact and consent by the
operation of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention (as well as to some
degree, nationalism), and a divergence with American common law
principles through the wide grant of nationality-based jurisdiction under
Article 14 of the French Civil Code.

Brussels Convention, art. 5, Sept. 27, 1968, O.J. (L 299) 32, accessed Mar. 18, 2020,
[https://perma.cc/
https://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm

LJZ8-YYP8].
60. Kevin M. Clermont & John R. B. Palmer, French Article 14 Jurisdiction, Viewed from
the United States, CORNELL L. FAC. PUBL'NS (Sept. 8, 2004), http://scholarship.law.comell.edu/

lsrp.papers/13 [https://perma.cc/4FWV-PTAU].

61. Joseph Halpern, "ExorbitantJurisdiction" and the Brussels Convention: Toward a
Theory ofRestraint, 9 YALE J. INT'L L. 369, 373 (1983).
62. Clermont & Palmer, supra note 60 (citing Ingelheim v. Fridberg, Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] req., Sept. 7, 1808, 2 S. Jur. 1, 579 (Fr.)).
63. Compare Wronique Child & Eric Guillemet, The Employment Law Review: France,
Deloitte (Mar. 18, 2021), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-employment-law-review/france
(providing an overview of how employment dispute treatment generally occurs sans exorbitant
jurisdiction), and Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Dec. 5,

2018, Bull. civ. II, No. 17-19.935 (Fr.) (case avoiding addressing exorbitant jurisdiction squarely

within an employment context due its intended 'internal' jurisdictional uses-i.e., extraterritorial
reach for French plaintiffs), with Geert Van Calster, No VAR needed here. FrenchSupreme Court
on choice of court ex-EU in employment contracts. X v AS Monaco, GAVC LAW (Jan. 1, 2019),
https://gavclaw.com/2019/01 /28/no-var-needed-here-french-supreme-court-on-choice-of-courtex-eu-in-employment-contracts-x-v-as-monaco/ [https://perma.cc/3S TW-BX37] (explaining the
underlying case while detailing the practical treatment of art. 14 being. left untouched by the
Court).

64. See

DAMASKA,

supra note 8, at 76-77.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol33/iss1/3

14

Wazlavek: The Pond Separates Cultures But Not Values: A Comparative Look at

20211

0 HE POND SEPARA IES CULTURES BUT NOT VALUES

89

A. Convergences in Legal Processes
Other convergences appear within the legal processes of both
countries, within both the core and periphery of shared values inherent in
consumer and demand driven economies. For example, both jurisdictions
attempt to provide streamlined coverage and broad protection for
consumer products and employment contracts. Ironically, cases such as
G & G Prods. LLC v. Rusic, likely would not be an issue for a French
plaintiff in an employment matter. Instead, most French workers would
just file suit in France, perhaps due to where the injury lies but also a
more streamlined administrative system for dispute resolution. 6 5
George A. Rutherglen observed, "A further resemblance to choice-offorum clauses lies in the categorical approach of European Union law to
restrict or prohibit such clauses in certain kinds of contracts, particularly
in consumer and employment contracts." 66 Further:
[E]urope generally takes a more categorical approach to
choice-of-law questions, facilitating the exclusion of
particular kinds of contracts from the presumed validity of
choice-of-law clauses. By regulation, the European Union
has reconciled and adjusted the principles of freedom of
contract, which favor the validity of such clauses, and
principles that protect parties in a relatively weak bargaining
position, such as consumers and employees. 6 7
Here, we have a large convergence of core values between both
countries. In the United States, there is a general blanket of coverage for
employment under the NLRA, et seq. Even those unfamiliar with
American labor law are often surprised that the NLRA itself is
particularly important. within the common law as the initial keystone of
labor law because of its precedential weight through interpretation. Even
public employment laws contemplate the binding nature of its precedent
due to the delayed recognition of the right to collectively bargain in the
public sector. The first public sector collective bargaining laws passed in
Wisconsin in 1959, fourteen years after the New Deal. 68 Similarly,
consumer protections for many products are based in the national
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 69 While many states have created even

65. G & G Prods. L.L.C. v. Rusic, 902 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2018).
66. GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN, TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION 37-59 (1st ed. 2016).

67. Id. at 57-58; cf Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC).
68. Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-SectorLabor in the Past Thirty
Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & ErM. L.J. 511, 517 (2013) (discussing the lag in public sector
bargaining rights as compared to private sector bargaining).

69. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as

amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312).
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stronger legislative protections, the national baseline serves as a way to
unify treatment of employment and consumer protection matters.
Although plaintiffs are afforded choice-of-forum and choice-of-law
within employment contracts under the common law, other important
baselines such as the minimum wage and occupational safety related
legislation are matters of federal supremacy. While this federal treatment
in the common law is also a national framework for legislative
protections, it pales in comparison to the rights afforded to French
workers enjoy in the French Labor Code. These procedural differences
lead to stronger protections for French workers, and better outcomes for
workers engaged in concerted activity.
Vastly different procedural outcomes are driven by substantive
economic "values that both cultures impose by law. Should recent
70
legislative attempts in America enjoy codification, the baseline of
protections for workers engaged in concerted activity would be raised to
a higher standard similar to the minimum safeguards and protections
afforded to workers in France. In turn, higher minimum safeguards and
protections for concerted activity in America would quell decades of
labor unrest allow labor organizations to bargain for the Common
Good. 71 Removing many of the punitive secondary boycott restrictions in
America would open the door to coordinated boycott and strike actions
that French workers widely enjoy. Through analysis then, there is a
similarity in problems and results. However, there is a stark divergence
in the application of legal processes, which reveals that there is a
presumption of differences driven by a familiar mutual cryptotype
affecting players within both jurisdictions: capitalism.
B. Divergence in Applications of Legal Processes
Compensation for injuries on the job, unification and stratification of
the administrative state, and maximum hours and minimum wage laws,
demonstrate that the largest formant in both France and America is that
of economic value. While the codification of the right to withdraw labor
aimed to decrease the pressure on employers from strike actions by
allowing French workers the opportunity to withdraw from unsafe
72
working conditions, a closer examination of the "living law" reveals a
divergence in applications of legal processes. The living law reveals that
capitalism is a cryptotype at play within both jurisdictions.
70. Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2021, H.R. 842, 117th Cong. (as passed by
House of Representatives, Mar. 9, 2021).
71. Stronger Unions, Stronger Communities, AM. FED'N TCHRS. (Nov. 2017)
11-17.pdf
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/report_strong__unions_stronger_communities
[https://perma.cc/63QT-HWJA].
72. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:A DynamicApproach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J.

COMPAR. L. 1, 22 (1991).
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A fundamental difference between the countries exists in
compensation for injuries on the job. Within the common law, workers'
compensation acts as an insurance pool for risk paid for by employers.
While each jurisdiction in the United States treats income replacement
differently, most jurisdictions do not allow recovery of the full amount of
wages for injuries on the job. In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
for example, benefits are limited to sixty percent of income. 73 Layered
within the workers' compensation system, injury for workers is industry
specific, with varying levels set by federal preemption in some cases. 74
French treatment, however, regards injury compensation as part of the
system of social security. The Cour de Cassation, in interpreting Articles
L. 443-2, R. 433-4 and R. 433-7 of the Social Security Code, interpreted
reinjury by aggravation as entitling a claimant to additional
remuneration. 7 5 In America, reinjury would be an extension of the benefit
claim. Both jurisdictions provide generally up to sixty percent
compensation, but French workers' compensation increases to eighty
percent after the twenty-nineth day of leave. 76 In extraordinary fashion
though, the claimant in the case interpreting the above Articles of the
French Labor Code was awarded the compensation level of his higher
salary in a new position after he suffered reinjury years later, a far better
remedy for workers than just extending the benefit claim for the base
salary during the initial injury.
This difference in substantive and procedural outcomes is the result of
a divergence between how both cultures value business interests. In
France, the social value of an individual being outside of the workforce
without wages is higher than the burden of social compensation. When
workers can recover and reenter the workforce productively, they can
help forward enterprise. In the common law, the limited recovery
insurance pools are singularly funded by employers, with limited
contributions to the pools by government agencies when there are critical
capital shortages budgetarily. Thus, the rudimentary view is that if the
cost to an employer is less to contest a claim than the compensation, the
net savings represents a victory for profits and costs the entire system
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 34 (2021).
74. Compare ch. 236, 35 Stat. 556 (1908) (Federal Employees Compensation Act as
enacted, which covers federal sector worker compensation and initially provided up to an entire
annual salary), with ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (Federal Employers Liability Act as enacted, which
covers railway employees' worker compensation and was initially silent on remuneration in terms

of salary).
75. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., July 7, 2016, Bull.

civ.

II, No. 15-22.038 (Fr.).

76. The FrenchSocial Security System HI- Accidents at Work and OccupationalDiseases,
CLEISS, https://www.cleiss.fr/docs/regimes/regimefrance/an_2.html [https://perma cc/E8DK-

UP8R] (last visited Mar. 18, 2021).
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less. In France, the subordinate role of judges to mechanically apply rules
is but part of the calculus, with hidden formants still favoring business
interests.
Another area of divergence is through the compartmentalized
administrative state within the French Civil Code. France largely has a
unified single system of administrative resolution, with the Cour de
Cassation's Civil Chamber acting as the highest arbiter of civil disputes.
In the common law, the stratification of agency review within the
executive branch occurs before the multilayering of judicial jurisdictions
that interpret rules specific to industries or sectors leading to a patchwork
system without uniformity.
This patchwork and piecemeal method of basic dispute resolution
within the common law leads to constant doctrinal conflict, causing a
77
backlog for straightforward administrative matters. Within the French
Labor Code workers still encounter the administrative state, but they do
not require a final agency determination before proceeding to civil
prosecution for matters like unfair workplace practices as we have seen
with nationality-based jurisdiction. This leaves open alternative avenues
of redress for French plaintiffs whose claims fail within the
compartmentalized administrative state.
Last, the "El Khomri Law" is also indicative of the controlling aspect
of business interests in the civil law of France. Proposed in 2016, the law
78
sought to "modernize" the social dialog and secure professional careers.
As reported in Libiration:
Considered too favorable to businesses, the text has
suffered, since its disclosure in February, the crossfire of an
inter-union led by the CGT ... [which] . . . mobilized
against it tens of thousands of opponents, who beat the
pavement during 12 national days of strikes and
79
demonstrations.
Ironically, the strong push for the law was from the leader of the
Socialist Party, French President Francois Hollande. Many credit the
passage of this law as a brokered deal between Hollande's government
and French business interests, and the subsequent social upheaval as one
of the significant reasons Hollande did not seek a second term as

77. See generally Michael C. Duff, How the U.S. Supreme Court Deemed the Workers'
375
Compensation Grand Bargain "Adequate" Without Defining Adequacy, 54 TULSA L. REV.

(2019) (discussing examples of even workers' compensation getting entangled between the
common law and the administrative state in America).

78. La loi travail a

LIBERATION
iti promulgude [ The Labor Law Has Been Promulgated],
2

(trans. Google, accessed Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.liberation.fr/france/ 016/08/09/la-loitravail-a-ete-promulguee_1471176 [https://perma.cc/2TJH-DGGZ].

79. Id.
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President. 80 The law attempted to reduce overtime payments for the
French workweek in excess of thirty-five hours, sought to make it easier
for companies to lay off workers, aimed to increase the amount of hours
of the work week, and tried to loosen restrictions on work hours.8
In the common law, maximum hours and the minimum wage are
similarly fashioned by business interests. For example, the Fair Labor and
Standards Act (FLSA) is limited in contemplating pure "maximum
hours." 82 Similarly, the FLSA sets the national minimum wage. The
Railway Act provides pure "maximum hours," but is narrow in scope,
applying only to transport workers and related jobs. These laws and
decisions share a focus primarily on the cost to employers and the
resulting net economic gain for society, not the tangible benefit to
workers or positive freedom. 83
The divergences in the application of legal processes further reveal
that the hidden formant in both jurisdictions is a preference for business
interests. Capitalism as a cryptotype within both the civil code and
common law jurisdictions. As concluded .below, these divergences are
simply a matter of convenience for policymakers, like Hollande or
Macron.
CONCLUSION

The French right to withdraw labor is a product of legislative
supremacy stemming from the codification movement in the nineteenth
century. The American view within the common law is that at-will
employment is the standard, alongside the judicial imposition of right to
work for public sector employees. The French right to withdraw labor is
a product of generations of social negotiations that continue into modern
times. The American model is a product of the easily swayed influences
that allow a new legal theory with little to no precedential value at the
time of its proposal to be adopted in sweeping fashion with very little
civil discourse, and damaging repercussions. The interplay between
80. Ingrid Melander, Grim Hollande Says He Won't Seek Second Term as French
President, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-electionholl ande/grim-hollan de-says-he-wont-seek-second-term -as-french-president-idUKBN13Q5F0

[https://perma.cc/WW5T-UZ3P].
81. Jonah Birch, A French Spring, JACOBIN (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.jacobin
mag.com/2016/04/france-labor-code-hollande-nuit-debout/ [https://perma.cc/QY46-CSDK].
82. Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (maximum hour laws deemed

valid), and L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (maximum
hour laws invalidated), with Wm. T. Pegues and Ben B. Taylor Jr., The Wage and Hour Law in
the Supreme Court, 3 LA. L. REV. 605, 609 (1941) (explaining the rationales for both cases through
the New Deal era).
83. See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING

WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982) (analyzing the Muller decision as an attack on women as
workers veiled in the altruism of labor laws).
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personal jurisdiction and contractual violations shows that in both
systems there are significant flaws to workplace protection that favor
business interests over the rights of workers.
Both systems converge and diverge at the core and periphery in terms
of shared values that favor business interests that can be observed through
cultural context. The formants of both systems demonstrate a cryptotype
informed by capitalism, despite the party of the executive or form of
government, or the scope of legislation. While French citizens enjoy
privileges such as nationality-based jurisdiction and stronger workplace
protections, these privileges inscribed in law are meaningless when the
executive yields to economic considerations. The common law produces
a presumption of difference in the legal applications in favor of this
cryptotype. In both jurisdictions these efforts represent parallel
diminutions of workers' rights motivated by the same values inherent
within capitalism that are superimposed through the law.
It would seem then that Damaska is right about reactive states if they
merely exist, especially in the western hemisphere, to resolve disputes
between two players. As we have seen repeatedly, more than two forces
exist in the form of disputes between workers and employer interests.
Comparativists such as Danneman would characterize this as a
presumption of similarity, while Zweigert and Ktz might more aptly
refer to this as the presumption of differences. Ultimately policymakers
and decisionmakers are informed by principles inherent within capitalism
as a growing modern Western trend. Those forces play out repeatedly in
divergences in application and convergences in processes between the
civil code and common law, revealing that this cryptotype is a driving
force in not only the formation of laws but the liying law.
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